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Bridget Lewis*  
I. Introduction 
The significant moral and normative force which comes with asserting that a 
particular social claim is a ‘human right’ has led to a variety of interest groups and 
organisations employing human rights rhetoric in advocating for social, legal or 
political change. In many cases this is manifested in the declaration of new rights 
without their having passed through the usual law-making processes. While this 
technique has proven successful for mobilising public support, it can lead to 
confusion about whether a particular human right exists in international law, and it 
could have the consequence of diminishing the status of human rights as a whole.1 
At the same time, it is essential that human rights law be adaptable to changing 
international issues and emerging threats. While human rights law has its 
foundations in rights theory going back several centuries, it ought not be confined 
to those traditional notions, and States should be free to develop and expand the 
law into new areas. However, law-making bodies must exercise caution in the 
expansion and development of human rights law, especially given the pressure they 
may face from NGOs and other interested parties seeking to utilise the value of 
human rights language to advance their objectives. That same value can be 
undermined by indiscriminate and uncritical expansion of human rights to 
encompass new claims. It can also be compromised where so-called new rights are 
in fact merely reiterations of existing rights. 
In order to illustrate these issues, this paper takes as a case study the right to a 
good environment. In the context of the significant global environmental crisis 
presently confronting us after centuries of consumption and growth, and given the 
certainty that our damage to the planet will continue to be felt for generations to 
come, legal recognition that a good environment is among humans’ fundamental 
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entitlements has obvious appeal. The concept of a right to a good environment has 
been the subject of scholarly debate since it was included in the Stockholm 
Declaration on the Human Environment in 1972.2 It has been picked up by 
numerous authors and interest groups seeking to strengthen action on both human 
welfare and environmental protection.3 While the literature includes a number of 
variations in terminology, including a right to a safe environment,4 a healthy 
environment,5 a healthful environment,6 a clean environment7 and a decent 
environment,8 these formulations have in common the notion that human beings are 
entitled to an environment of a certain quality, although in some cases the content 
and scope of the right are not defined.9 Versions of the right to a good environment 
can be found in regional human rights treaties in Africa10 the Americas,11 and the 
Arab world,12 but it is not included in any of the multilateral United Nations human 
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rights conventions.13 There have been ongoing calls for its wider recognition 
within international law.14 This paper identifies a number of risks associated with 
the uncritical expansion of human rights, and argues that the right to a good 
environment should be carefully examined to determine its suitability for 
recognition in international law. The paper identifies various considerations which 
are relevant to such an assessment. It first looks to human rights theory to identify 
the sorts of claims which are appropriate for recognition as human rights. It then 
draws on a range of normative, practical and political considerations, which are 
relevant to the question of whether the proposed right could be effectively 
implemented and enforced. Together these considerations can be taken as a set of 
guiding principles or criteria.  
After examining the right to a good environment against these criteria, the paper 
concludes that recognition of the right to a good environment cannot be justified 
and that international attention should instead focus on improving the application of 
existing rights to environmental issues. In examining the right to a good 
environment, the paper contributes to the discussion on the expansion of human 
rights law more generally, and identifies a number of significant issues which must 
be considered when balancing the need for dynamism against the need to retain that 
which makes human rights such a powerful area of law. 
II. The need to balance dynamism and proliferation in 
international human rights law 
In 1969 Bilder recognised that ‘[t]o assert that a particular social claim is a human 
right is to vest it emotionally and morally with an especially high order of 
legitimacy’.15 The significant value of having a particular claim designated as a 
‘human right’ has led to a wide variety of interest groups and non-governmental 
organisations seeking to have new human rights recognised.16 Alston identified this 
effect in relation to the emerging right to development in the 1980s. He commented 
that ‘[g]iven such perceptions of the potential power of rights rhetoric, it is hardly 
surprising that claims for the recognition of new human rights have proliferated 
dramatically in recent years’.17 This has become a ‘time-honoured and proven 
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technique’ for mobilising public support around a particular issue, and has been 
employed by numerous international organisations.18 Consequently, as D’Amato 
has identified, ‘[m]any “rights” have been asserted in print, ranging from the 
fundamental to the vague, from the consistent to the incoherent’.19 
Bilder identified the consequences of such an expansion of human rights noting 
that  
acceptance of the human rights label for some types of social claims while denying it to 
others implicitly accomplishes a sort of ordering of social values, prejudging which 
claims and interests are to prevail and which are to be sacrificed when different values 
come into conflict’.20  
He suggested that if we allow too many claims to be designated as human rights, 
the ‘usefulness of human rights as an ordering concept may be distorted, 
diminishing their helpfulness in solving those crucial and recurrent conflicts 
between competing values which every society confronts’.21  
Bilder further argued that  
[w]here obviously trivial or highly specialized [sic] claims are included, the 
dignity and status of the human rights concept are depreciated…[T]he present 
broad and indiscriminate use of the term “human rights” may obscure what are 
in fact very different types of social ends and that various human rights may 
have little in common but their label.22  
Higgins has warned that the ‘coinage’ of human rights will ‘undoubtedly become 
debased’ if States agree to the expansion of human rights without adequate 
justification, with the consequence that ‘the major operational importance of 
designating a right a human right – that opprobrium attaches to ignoring it – will be 
lost’.23 Alston agrees that ‘a proliferation of new rights would be much more likely 
to contribute to a serious devaluation of the human rights currency than to enrich 
significantly the overall coverage provided by existing rights’.24  
The risk that international law will tolerate the overuse of the human rights 
label, and consequently that the integrity and weight of existing human rights will 
be undermined, is exacerbated by the uncritical manner in which rights develop 
within the international system.25 While many international organisations and 
                                                            
18  Alston, ‘Conjuring Up New Rights’, above n 1, 608. 
19  Anthony D’Amato, ‘The Concept of Human Rights in International Law’ (1982) 82 
Columbia Law Review 1110, 1128. See also Makau Mutua, 'Standard Setting in 
Human Rights: Critique and Prognosis' (2007) 29 Human Rights Quarterly 547, 557-
58. 
20  Bilder, above n 15, 174. 
21  Ibid 175. 
22  Ibid 176. 
23  Rosalyn Higgins, Problems and Process: International Law and How We Use It 
(Oxford University Press, 1994) 105. 
24  Alston, ‘Conjuring Up New Rights’, above n 1, 614; see also Philip Alston, ‘Creating 
New Environmental Rights Under International Law: Desirability and Feasibility’ 
(Paper presented at Human Rights and Environmental Protection: The Vital Link, 
University of New South Wales, 12 October 1991); Marks, above n 1, 451. 
25  Alston, ‘Making Space for New Human Rights’, above n 1, 10.  
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interest groups have sought to have particular claims recognised as human rights, 
Alston argues that international organisations are ‘notoriously unsatisfactory 
incubators of intellectual ideas’.26 Where an organisation has identified the 
recognition of a new right as one of its priorities, ‘challenging scholarly analysis’ 
and ‘critical propositions’ are nearly impossible.27 Ramcharan argues that when it 
comes to proposals to recognise new rights, 
[u]nfortunately the debate tends to proceed mostly on the basis of each protagonist’s 
assertions of what he or she considers to be human rights rather than in terms of the 
criteria available in international law for determining what a human right is and whether 
an asserted right or category of rights meets those criteria.28 
The value of the human rights label being attached to a particular interest is so 
great that advocates will inevitably push for the recognition of a new right without 
necessarily examining the full implications or inviting critical input from opposing 
or even neutral analysts. A number of new rights have been declared by various 
United Nations organs, though Alston has noted several shortcomings in processes 
through which these rights have been proclaimed.29 Alston has argued that the 
concern with new human rights is not their proliferation per se, but the ‘haphazard, 
almost anarchic manner in which this expansion is being achieved. Indeed, some 
such rights seem to have been literally conjured up, in the dictionary sense of being 
‘brought into existence as if by magic’.30  
Despite these concerns, there is nothing to prevent States from recognising a 
human right to a good environment, or any other human right, should they choose. 
States, and the international organisations to which they belong, have exercised this 
power to proclaim new rights in the past, with a number of rights being 
acknowledged since the initial adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights in 1948 and the two International Covenants of 1966.31 
This ability to recognise new rights is an essential quality of contemporary 
human rights. Human rights law must be adaptable to changing international issues 
and emerging threats, and as such some degree of dynamism within the system is 
necessary. As Ramcharan says,  
[i]t is fallacious to confine the definition of human rights only to traditional categories or 
criteria. There are ongoing processes of discovery, recognition, enlargement, enrichment 
and refining, and adapting and updating...It is open to authoritative organs to recognise 
                                                            
26  Ibid. 
27  Ibid. 
28  Ramcharan, above n 1, 268. 
29  Alston, ‘Conjuring Up New Rights’, above n 1, 612-613.  
30  Alston, ‘Conjuring Up New Rights’, above n 1, 607. citing The Concise Oxford 
Dictionary (Clarendon, 1976) 214. 
31  For example the rights of women and children in the Convention on the Elimination of 
All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, opened for signature 18 December 1979, 
1249 UNTS 13 (entered into force 3 September 1981) and of children in the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child, opened for signature 20 November 1989, 1577 
UNTS 3 (entered into force 2 September 1990).  
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new rights and to declare or proclaim their existence, particularly if an international 
consensus exists over the recognition of such a right.32  
The challenge is to address the need for international human rights law to be 
responsive to emerging needs and challenges while maintaining the normative force 
of the concept of human rights by avoiding unnecessary proliferation of new rights. 
III. Criteria for New Rights 
To assist with this task a number of guiding principles or criteria can be articulated. 
These are informed by the theoretical foundations of human rights as well as by a 
range of legal, pragmatic and political considerations, including those put forward 
by various scholars who have considered this issue.33 It is acknowledged that the 
task of identifying substantive criteria for new human rights is not without its 
problems. Alston identified this issue, arguing that establishing fixed criteria is 
difficult in an area which is in a constant state of ‘evolutionary flux’.34 But it is 
argued that it is precisely this tendency towards flux which indicates that some 
guidelines are required. With this in mind, the following principles are put forward 
not as mandatory requirements but as guidelines or baseline parameters. 
(a) New rights must be independently justifiable 
In defining criteria for the admission of new rights, a starting point is to specify that 
the right must be independently justifiable. This requirement follows from the fact 
that the purpose of articulating criteria is to avoid the unnecessary proliferation of 
rights. To do this we must have some concept of when a new right might be 
necessary. It is argued that a right is not necessary when the same objectives can be 
achieved through rights which are already recognised in international human rights 
law. An appropriate candidate for recognition must therefore be something ‘new’ – 
something which is not simply a reiteration of existing rights but is independently 
justifiable.  A right which is merely repetitive of existing rights would be 
redundant, and arguably would contribute to the excessive proliferation of human 
rights.35 
Furthermore, the right must have some inherent value. It is not enough to argue 
that the right is complementary to other rights or instrumental in fulfilling them. 
Donnelly explained the importance of independent justification when he described 
the instrumental fallacy in human rights theory. The instrumental fallacy reasons 
that human beings have a right to anything which is instrumental to or beneficial in 
                                                            
32  Ramcharan, above n 1, 280-281; see also Mutua, above n 19, 619; Bilder, above n 15, 
175; Marks, above n 1, 451. 
33  Ramcharan, above n 1; Marks, above n 1; Noralee Gibson, 'The Right to a Clean 
Environment' (1990) 54 Saskatchewan Law Review 5. 
34  Alston, ‘Conjuring Up New Rights’, above n 1, 616. Alston himself attempted to set 
out possible criteria, as have Ramcharan, above n 1, and Nickel, above n 4, among 
others. 
35  Alston, ‘Conjuring Up New Rights’, above n 1, 615; Gibson, above n 33, 5; Steve 
Turner, ‘The Human Right to a Good Environment: The Sword in the Stone’ (2004) 4 
Non-State Actors and International Law 277, 299; Theodor Meron, 'Norm Making and 
Supervision in International Human Rights: Reflections on Institutional Order' (1982) 
76(4) American Journal of International Law 754, 756. 
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achieving some other human right. Donnelly argues against this proposition: 
‘[s]imply because A requires x to enjoy r does not entail that A has a right to x’.36 
New rights must be capable of justification in their own right, not on the grounds 
that they facilitate the enjoyment of other rights.  
With respect to the right to a good environment, in order to conclude that it 
should be recognised in international human rights law it must be possible to define 
the right in a way which gives it inherent value without relying on other existing 
rights, so that it is capable of independent justification. There have been many 
proposals put forward for recognising a right to environment, but many of these 
have constructed it as a composite or synthesis right. For example, Rodriguez-
Rivera has argued that ‘[t]he articulation of a human right to environment 
encompasses a compendium of rights constructed in an effort to protect the 
environment, as well as human life and dignity’.37 Downs and Symonides have 
argued that the right to a good environment is justified because of the mutually 
supportive relationship between the environment and human rights.38 Other 
proposals have defined it as a right to a healthy environment, or an environment 
which is good for human health or well-being, or which provides the necessary 
conditions for human flourishing.39 
Human rights law already guarantees the rights to life, health, food, water and 
self-determination, and the environmental dimensions of these rights have been 
increasingly recognised.40 In his separate opinion in the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros 
case, Vice-President Weeramantry stated that: ‘the protection of the environment is 
... a vital part of contemporary human rights doctrine, for it is sine qua non for 
numerous human rights such as the right to health and the right to life itself’.41 In 
line with this understanding of the relationship between the environment and 
human rights, a growing number of cases have held that environmental degradation 
                                                            
36  Jack Donnelly, ‘In Search of the Unicorn: The Jurisprudence and Politics of the Right 
to Development’ (1985) 15 California Western International Law Journal 473, 485. 
37  Rodriguez-Rivera, above n 3, 9. 
38  Downs, above n 3, 362, 366, 377-78; Symonides, above n 3, 29. 
39  Hayward, above n 3, 11. The right to a ‘healthy’ environment has been advocated by 
Giorgetta, above n 5, 181; Hodkova, above n 14; James T McClymonds, ‘The Human 
Right to A Healthy Environment: An International Legal Perspective’ (1992) 37 New 
York Law School Law Review 583. Gravelle advocates for a right to a ‘healthful’ 
environment, which he argues is one that is good for human health: above n 6, 637. 
40  United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Analytical Study on the 
Relationship Between Human Rights and the Environment, 19th sess, Agenda Items 2 
and 3, UN Doc A/HRC/19/34, (16 December 2011) paras 64-73; John Knox, Report of 
the Independent Expert on the Issue of Human Rights Obligations Relating to the 
Enjoyment of a Safe, Clean and Healthy Environment: Mapping Report, 25th sess, 
Agenda Item 3 UN Doc No A/HRC/25/53 (30 December 2013); Office of the High 
Commissioner for Human Rights and United Nations Environment Programme, 
Human Rights and the Environment: Rio+20 Joint Report OHCHR and UNEP, 
(Background document for OHCHR-UNEP Side Event 'Human Rights at the Centre of 
Sustainable Development - Honouring Principle 1', United Nations Conference on 
Sustainable Development, Rio de Janeiro, 19 June 2012). 
41  Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary v Slovakia) (Judgment) [1997] ICJ Rep 7, 91 
(Vice-President Weeramantry).  
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has amounted to a violation of human rights.42 Furthermore, a number of 
procedural rights are recognised in international environmental law to ensure that 
persons affected by environmental decision-making are fully informed about the 
potential impacts, are able to participate in the process, and are entitled to 
compensation for environmental harm.43 
Given that existing rights already have application in situations of 
environmental degradation, any definition of a right to a good environment which 
is defined by reference to human well-being would not satisfy the requirement for 
independent justification, as it would merely duplicate rights which are already 
protected.  
The following sections will outline a number of additional criteria which, it is 
argued, help to provide ‘quality control’ in the expansion of new rights. In 
assessing the concept of a right to a good environment against these criteria it is 
argued that where a criterion can only be satisfied by defining the right in a way 
which makes it reiterative of other human rights, then it should be concluded that 
the criterion cannot be satisfied. 
(b) New rights must be compatible with the theoretical foundations of 
human rights 
One of the fundamental questions to be answered when determining whether a 
proposed right should be recognised in international human rights law is whether in 
substance it is the sort of thing which is appropriate for inclusion. In assessing this, 
regard should be had to the philosophical underpinnings of human rights in order to 
ensure that the rights which are recognised in legal instruments are consistent with 
the theoretical rationale for human rights.44 This in turn helps to avoid the risk of 
                                                            
42  See, for example, Yakye Axa Indigenous Community v Paraguay (Merits, Reparations 
and Costs) (2005) Inter-American Court HR (ser C) No 125; Human Rights 
Committee, Communication No 67/1980, 17th sess, UN Doc CCPR/C/17/D/67/1980 
(27 October 1982) 20 (‘Port Hope Environmental Group v Canada’); Human Rights 
Committee, Communication No 645/1995, 57th sess, UN Doc CCPR/C/57/D/645/1995 
(22 July 1996) (‘Bordes and Temeharo v France); Yanomami Indians v Brazil 
(Resolution) (1985) Inter-American Commission HR (ser L/V/II.66) No 7615; 
Sawhoyamaxa Indigenous Community v Paraguay (Merits, Reparations and Costs) 
(2006) Inter-American Cout HR (ser C) No 146 [161]; Budayeva v Russia (European 
Court of Human Rights, Application Nos 15339/02, 21166/02, 20058/02, 11673/02 
and 15343/02, 20 March 2008); Oneryildiz v Turkey [2004] XII Eur Court HR 657; 
The Social and Economic Rights Action Center and the Center for Economic and 
Social Rights v Nigeria, (2001) African Commission  No 155/96  
43  Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-Making and 
Access to Justice in Environmental Matters, opened for signature 25 June 1998, 2161 
UNTS 447 (entered into force 30 October 2001); The Antarctic Treaty, opened for 
signature 1 December 1959, 402 UNTS 71 (entered into force 23 June 1961); Protocol 
on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty, opened for signature 4 October 
1991, 30 ILM 1461 (entered into force 14 January 1998), Annex II; Convention on 
Biological Diversity, opened for signature 5 June 1992, 1760 UNTS 79 (entered into 
force 29 December 1993).   
44  J G Merrills, ‘Environmental Protection and Human Rights: Conceptual Aspects’, in 
Alan Boyle and Michael Anderson (eds), Human Rights Approaches to Environmental 
Protection (Clarendon Press, 1996) 25, 25; Higgins, above n 23. 
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diluting the strength of existing rights and of international human rights law in 
general. If the term ‘human rights’ is neglected on a theoretical level then there is a 
risk that ‘many might fill the gap with notions at odds with the essence of human 
rights’.45  
Much scholarly work has been devoted to addressing the question posed by 
Finnis: what, if any, is the underlying principle unifying the various types of 
relationships that are reasonably said to concern ‘rights’?46 Countless theories of 
rights have been expounded over time in an attempt to describe what rights are, 
who should be entitled to them and how they should function. These theories 
attempt to explain the philosophical justification of rights (including but not 
exclusively human rights) and in so doing provide various tests for whether a 
particular object ought to be called a right. The theories discussed below are not 
exhaustive, but represent a selection of the major approaches. Possible justifications 
for the right to a good environment will be considered in relation to each of the 
theoretical approaches in order to demonstrate that the right cannot be adequately 
justified under any of the key theories of human rights.  
(i) Natural Rights  
One of the principal theories advanced as a justification for human rights is natural 
rights theory. The philosophical heritage of modern natural rights theories can be 
traced back to Thomas Aquinas, and to early Western philosophers like Thomas 
Hobbes and John Locke, who developed theories of natural law which held that 
certain basic principles of moral behaviour can be discerned from human nature, 
and are not dependent on recognition by the State. 
Reflecting the basic principles of natural law, natural rights theory posits that 
each individual person is entitled to a number of fundamental claims which derive 
from their inherent human dignity.47 As Donnelly explains, rights derive from 
human nature and consist of such things as are essential to the protection and 
realisation of human nature and dignity, those things which are necessary for the 
maintenance of a life worthy of a human being.48  
Natural rights theory continues to play a significant role in contemporary 
human rights discourse. Many scholars maintain that human rights law developed 
out of natural rights theory and that it remains the appropriate philosophical 
justification for modern human rights, such that any new addition to the catalogue 
of human rights must satisfy the requirements of a natural right.49 For example, 
                                                            
45  Linda Hajjar Leib, Human Rights and the Environment: Philosophical, Theoretical 
and Legal Perspectives (Martinus Nijhoff, 2011), 41. 
46  John Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights (Oxford University Press, 2nd ed, 2011), 
203. 
47  Ibid 272-273; Donnelly, ‘In Search of the Unicorn’, above n 36, 495-97. 
48  Jack Donnelly, ‘Human Rights as Natural Rights’ (1982) 4 Human Rights Quarterly 
391, 397. 
49  Ibid 403; Alston, ‘Making Space for New Human Rights’, above n 1, 26-27. 
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Finnis considers human rights to be the contemporary idiom for natural rights, and 
he uses the two terms interchangeably.50  
Donnelly states that international human rights law has incorporated and is 
based upon the tradition of natural rights.51 As evidence of this he points to the fact 
that the UDHR and other prominent human rights instruments refer to the source of 
human rights as being the inherent dignity of the individual.52 He argues that in the 
UDHR ‘human rights are unambiguously conceptualised as being inherent to 
humans and not the product of social cooperation’.53 He cites article 2 of the 
UDHR (the terms of which are echoed in article 2 of both the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights) which provides that human rights are 
guaranteed to all people regardless of race, nationality or social origin.54 Donnelly 
argues that these statements confirm that contemporary human rights are natural 
rights, in that they flow from our existence as human beings, and are not a product 
of our social cooperation or membership of a community.55 From this position, 
Donnelly argues that any right which does not satisfy the requirements of a natural 
right cannot be considered a human right at all.  
In order for the right to a good environment to be justifiable under natural rights 
theory, a good environment must be viewed as something which is necessary to 
advance human dignity and a life worthy of a human being. At the same time 
however, this must be established in a way which does not merely reiterate the 
relationship between the environment and other rights which are already 
recognised, in order to ensure compliance with the first requirement of 
independence. 
                                                            
50  Finnis, above n 46, 198. But note that Finnis does distinguish human rights as natural 
rights from the list of rights guaranteed by international human rights law, and 
suggests that the realm of true human rights is in fact narrower than international 
doctrine would indicate, at 210. 
51  Donnelly, ‘Human Rights as Natural Rights’ above n 48, 403; Alston, ‘Making Space 
for New Rights’, above n 1, 26. 
52  Universal Declaration of Human Rights, GA Res 217A (III), UN GAOR, 3rd sess, 
183rd plen mtg, UN Doc A/810 (10 December 1948) (‘UDHR’), Preamble: ‘Whereas 
the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the 
human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world.’ The 
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Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, opened for signature 16 December 
1966, 993 UNTS 3 (entered into force 3 January, 1976) (‘ICESCR’): ‘Recognizing that 
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It is not sufficient, for example, to argue that a good environment is necessary 
because it provides a means of subsistence, an adequate standard of living, 
economic prosperity or good health. It would also not be enough to argue that the 
environment has some inherent value which we are morally obliged to protect. We 
must be able to identify some independent and indispensable contribution that a 
good environment makes to the pursuit of human dignity. The environment is 
obviously essential in fulfilling our basic needs for food, water and shelter, and a 
good environment facilitates our health and livelihoods generally, as well as our 
social and cultural lives.56 However, these sorts of justifications would seem to 
transgress the prohibition on the instrumental fallacy.  
Arguments could be advanced that the environment comprises ecosystems, 
species and natural spaces which have inherent value and which we are obliged to 
protect. While this would view a good environment as something more than a mere 
aspiration, imposing upon us a moral obligation to protect other species and 
ecosystems, the source of that obligation would not appear to be our own human 
dignity, but rather the inherent value of the environment itself. It would not, 
therefore, be a sufficient basis from which to describe a human right which is 
consistent with the requirements of natural rights theory. 
One possible solution to this problem relies on a reconceptualisation of human 
nature so as to view human beings as part of the ecosystem, on an equal footing 
with other nonhuman species, similar to the view of humans which can be found in 
the discourse of deep ecology. Deep ecology is a movement in environmental 
philosophy which posits that ‘all organisms and entities in the ecosphere, as parts of 
the interrelated whole, are equal in intrinsic worth.’57 Flowing from this, it is held 
that ‘the well-being and flourishing of human and nonhuman life on Earth have 
value in themselves ... These values are independent of the usefulness of the 
nonhuman world for human purposes’.58  
By viewing humans as an integral part of the ecosystem the quality of the 
environment as a whole could be seen to influence the quality of our lives within it, 
making the welfare of the environment integral to human dignity and wellbeing. 
However, this represents a radical departure from the classical concept of natural 
law, which attributes a special character to human dignity. While natural rights 
theory does allow for various conceptions of human nature, it is argued that such an 
                                                            
56  See arguments of Symonides, above n 3, 29; Rodriguez-Rivera, above n 3; Downs, 
above n 3, 352. 
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movement: A summary’ in Alan Drengson and Yuichi Inoue (eds), The Deep Ecology 
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in Alan Boyle and Michael Anderson (eds), Human Rights Approaches to 
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12 Australian Year Book of International Law Vol 33 
extreme divergence could not be accommodated within that theory, but would 
represent some other kind of justification.  
It seems therefore that it is not possible to formulate a right to a good 
environment in a way which satisfies the requirements of natural rights theory.  
While the environment is clearly essential to our ongoing well-being, and has its 
own inherent value which we are arguably obliged to recognise and protect, neither 
of these factors are capable of establishing a good environment as something which 
is essential to our human dignity, at least not without relying on some already 
recognised right as an intermediate link. Given that natural rights theory does not 
support a right to a good environment, we must turn to other possible theories of 
rights to see if any of them provide a more useful theoretical justification. 
(ii) Will Theory 
One alternative theory which has been used to explain human rights, and which 
could provide a philosophical justification for the right to a good environment, is 
will theory.  This theory assumes that rights flow from each individual’s ability to 
choose and exercise free will. As Finnis explains, under will theory, ‘the point and 
unifying characteristic of rules which entail or create rights is that such rules 
specifically recognise and respect a person’s choice, either negatively by not 
impeding or obstructing it … or affirmatively by giving legal or moral effect to 
it’,59 
One of the principal proponents of will theory, H.L.A. Hart, described rights-
holders as ‘small scale sovereigns’.60 According to will theory, to have a right is to 
have ‘the ability to determine what others may and may not do, and so to exercise 
authority over a certain domain of affairs’,61 The theory has links to Immanuel 
Kant’s critical philosophy, which reasons that a person cannot be used as a means 
to an end but is an end in him/herself and is entitled to autonomy and dignity as an 
individual with free will and the capacity for moral choice.62 For Kant, human 
autonomy is the source of all laws of nature, and moral rules derive from human 
reason. From this assertion of human autonomy as the defining human 
characteristic, will theory suggests that to have a right is to have the ability to limit 
or direct the actions of others.  
There are a number of challenges to establishing a good environment as a 
human right under will theory. Firstly, it is questionable whether will theory would 
support any form of collective or solidarity right. The emphasis on human 
autonomy would suggest that will theory would only accept rights which flow from 
an individual’s inherent free will, and not from any social organisation or 
relationship.  
                                                            
59  Finnis, above n 46, 204. 
60  H L A Hart, Essays on Bentham: Studies in Jurisprudential and Political Theory 
(Clarendon Press, 1982) 183. 
61  Leif Wenar ‘Rights’ in Edward N Zalta (ed.) Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy 
(Fall 2015 Edition) <http://plato.stanford.edu.au/entries/rights/>  
62  Immanuel Kant, Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals (Allen W Wood trans, 
Yale University Press, 2002) [trans of: Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten (first 
published 1785)]. 
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The enjoyment of the environment clearly has a collective dimension, as it is 
something that we experience and benefit from in community with other members 
of society (or other members of the ecosystem). Several authors have supported the 
idea of a right to a good environment as a solidarity or collective right which, 
although belonging to individuals, requires collective action to secure their 
fulfilment.63 For example, Lee argued that the right should incorporate both 
individual and collective elements given that some forms of environmental 
degradation are best understood as group claims.64 Gravelle has proposed that the 
right to a good environment might be viewed as a third generation right on the basis 
that it is ‘several steps removed from those fundamental rights which individuals 
can vindicate’.65 
It is difficult to reconcile the individual autonomy at the core of will theory with 
the collective way in which we enjoy and experience the environment. Two 
possible formulations could be put forward, but in both situations the objective of 
environmental protection would appear to be undermined. One possibility involves 
adopting a narrow definition of the environment, viewing it as referring to an 
individual’s localised surroundings, such that one person’s actions with respect to 
their environment would not impact on another’s enjoyment of his/her 
environment. This definition presents two problems however. Practically, the 
definition ignores the reality of environmental systems. It is not possible to 
disconnect the elements of the environment and the natural systems and processes 
which comprise it so as to guarantee that one person’s actions will not affect 
anyone else’s rights. 
Further, this segmented view of the environment is antithetical to the 
understanding of the environment and our relationship with it which has prompted 
calls for the recognition of the right in the first place. It perverts our usual 
understanding of the environment as comprising interconnected natural spaces, 
ecosystems and biodiversity, not capable of division into individualised units. By 
making the environment a thing which each of us has at our own disposal to do 
with as we choose, this construction would empower individuals to destroy the 
environment according to their will, rather than strengthen environmental 
protection for the good of humanity and the environment itself.  
A second possible conceptualisation is based on the assumption that our right to 
a good environment imposes a corresponding duty on the State to protect the 
environment for the benefit of individual right-holders. Under will theory an 
individual should be able to waive that right and permit the State to harm the 
environment. This could arguably be achieved through democratic processes, 
allowing States to carry out environmentally harmful activities based on the 
consent they have received from individuals through informed decision-making. 
                                                            
63  McClymonds, above n 39, 591; also Downs, above n 3, 351, 365 and Symonides, 
above n 3, 39. 
64  John Lee, ‘The Underlying Legal Theory to Support a Well-Defined Human Right to a 
Healthy Environment as a Principle of Customary International Law’ (2000) 25 
Columbia Journal of Environmental Law 283, 297. 
65  Gravelle, above n 6, 636.  
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This conceptualisation allows for an understanding of the environment which is 
more realistic, as it recognises our common interest in the environment and the 
interconnectedness of environmental components, but it relies on a more limited 
construction of individual autonomy. Will theory creates rights and duties based on 
individual claims, powers, privileges and immunities, and these must be understood 
as arising from individual will, and not dependent on the State. While the State may 
be the bearer of duties which correspond to our rights, it is not the only such duty-
bearer; other individuals will bear duties as well. 
The common concern we all have in the environment ultimately makes it 
something which cannot be reduced to individualised claims and powers such as 
are envisaged by will theory. We cannot waive a right to a good environment in the 
same way as other rights as it does not flow from our autonomy and freedom of 
choice. The nature of our relationship with the environment suggests that the right 
to a good environment cannot be satisfactorily explained by a will theory account 
of human rights.  
(iii) Interest Theory 
Interest theory offers another alternative explanation for why certain things are 
considered ‘rights’. According to interest theory, rights are those things that human 
beings are entitled to claim because they are necessary for their well-being or to 
further their interests. Joseph Raz developed an interest theory of rights, arguing 
that a person has a right to x when x is a fundamental interest that is weighty 
enough to impose obligations on others.66 As Caney explains, ‘we ascribe rights to 
protect highly valued interests (such as liberty of conscience, association, and 
expression) and our standard ascription of rights is guided by our account of what 
persons’ most important interests are’.67 
Feinberg has argued that anything can have rights where it is capable of having 
interests, that is, where it can have a ‘good’ or ‘well-being’ of its own which should 
be protected by legal or moral rules.68 From this basis he has argued that animals 
and future generations can possess rights, but not ‘mere things’, which have no 
capacity to have desires or aims.69 Van Dyke’s account of human rights also 
appears to draw on interest theory as he asserts that rights are things which are 
essential to the pursuit of our most basic interests and needs.70 Okin and Miller 
have also presented similar accounts of human rights which rely on the contribution 
that rights make to fundamental human interests and needs.71 
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If the right to a good environment is to be justified according to interest theory 
we must be able to show that a good environment is necessary to achieving some 
human interest. At first glance this seems intuitively straightforward: protection of 
the environment is something which concerns most people and few would argue 
against the general proposition that a good or healthy environment is preferable to 
an unhealthy or degraded environment. For example, Hayward has argued that ‘an 
adequate environment is as basic a condition of human flourishing as any of those 
that are already protected as human rights.’72 However, if we are to justify the right 
to a good environment on the basis of interest theory, we need to show that a good 
environment is in the human interest for some reason other than its instrumental 
value in achieving other human interests (such as health, subsistence, economic 
prosperity etc). 
The relationship between human beings and the environment is a topic of much 
discussion and debate. Various theories of environmental ethics have been 
developed to explain how humans can and should interact with the environment, 
ranging from strictly anthropocentric to largely ecocentric approaches.73 It is not 
feasible here to canvass all the possible arguments for why a good environment is 
in the human interest. Two examples are examined below to illustrate the difficulty 
of justifying the right under interest theory. 
(iv) Humans have an Interest in Protecting the Environment because It 
Gives Us Pleasure 
It could be argued that humans derive pleasure from the environment and take 
comfort in knowing that the environment is in good condition.74 For example, 
many humans are concerned about the survival of tigers or polar bears in the wild, 
or the conservation of the Amazon rainforest or the Great Barrier Reef. Those of us 
who share these concerns would argue that seeing the environment protected is in 
our interest. However, very few of us would experience any direct or practical 
change in our lives if tigers or polar bears went extinct, or the rainforest or reef 
suffered irreparable damage. People who rely on certain species or natural spaces 
more directly, for example as species to hunt or fish, or as tourism destinations 
from which they draw a livelihood, would obviously have a more direct 
relationship, but their interest would then be described as something other than 
pleasure, and the loss of those species or spaces would implicate other existing 
rights. For the rest of us, the argument is that we derive pleasure from knowing that 
the environment is protected because of our concern for its welfare.  There are a 
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number of problems which arise in attempting to transplant our concern for the 
environment into a right to see it protected however. 
First, a distinction needs to be drawn between being interested in the 
conservation of the environment and having an interest in that outcome sufficient to 
justify the protection of that interest as a right. For example, I may derive pleasure 
from playing a musical instrument, but that is not enough justification for declaring 
a right to play music. Furthermore, concern for the environment, like playing 
music, is by no means universal. While most people would claim an interest in their 
immediate environment as it affects them, many people may have no interest in the 
natural world more generally. Human rights, however, are said to be universal – 
they are rights which are guaranteed to all people. It seems difficult to justify to a 
universal right to a good environment based on the concern that only some humans 
have for it.  
(v) Human Beings are Part of a Global Ecosystem which we have an 
Interest Protecting 
Another possible argument for asserting that a good environment is in the human 
interest draws on the premise of the deep ecology movement that human beings are 
part of the global ecosystem and therefore have an interest in securing its continued 
survival. Such an interest would not be limited to the particular human needs which 
are facilitated by the environment, but would extend to include an interest in the 
diversity and longevity of the natural world in general. 
Reconceptualising humans’ relationship with and role within the natural world 
could work as a way of establishing an interest capable of expression as a right 
under the interest theory. If we view ourselves as being one part of a larger 
ecosystem then we would clearly have an interest in the well-being of the system as 
a whole. However, if we are to view humans as being equal members of the 
ecosystem, as deep ecologists would suggest, then we would have to extend equal 
rights to all other members of the ecosystem. This is at odds with traditional human 
rights doctrines which, for better or worse, place a particular kind of value on being 
human. It should be noted that for these and related reasons deep ecologists are 
critical of the proposal to recognise a human right to a good environment, arguing 
that it wrongly privileges humans over nonhuman species.75  
There is also the problem of identifying who would be an appropriate claimant 
where an alleged violation of the right to a good environment had occurred. If our 
right to a good environment flows from our equal membership in the global 
ecosystem then we are arguably all potential claimants should environmental 
destruction occur. Such a limitless class of claimants is unworkable. We could try 
to limit this class by requiring some special link to the harm in order to establish 
standing, but that raises the question of whether that nexus could be defined in a 
way which did not rely on facts which are the subject of other human rights. If the 
human right to a good environment is to be practically workable then it is argued 
that some more specific basis for it is required than our equal membership of the 
global ecosystem. 
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While on first inspection it seems intuitively obvious that humans have an 
interest in maintaining a good environment, it is a difficult challenge to explain the 
precise nature of that interest without resorting to arguments which rely on the 
importance of environment to the enjoyment of other human rights. Arguments 
which rely on a general concern for the natural world seem to lack the universal 
character or specificity necessary to transplant them into a human right.  Reasoning 
based on our equal membership of the global ecosystem seems inordinately broad, 
creating significant challenges in terms of the legal workability of the ensuing right. 
This analysis of the right to a good environment from different theoretical 
perspectives suggests a number of conclusions. First, it is clear that all theoretical 
approaches require some link to fundamental human qualities or needs, leading to 
some similar answers to the question of ‘what sorts of things are human rights?’ As 
a consequence of their emphasis on essential human needs and characteristics, the 
different theoretical approaches consistently reject recognition of new rights which 
are merely repetitive of existing rights, or which are justifiable only on the basis 
that they support the fulfilment of other rights.  
These two factors – the need for some link to essential human qualities or 
needs, and the imperative to avoid reiteration or duplication of existing rights – 
combine to present a significant challenge to the task of seeking to justify a right to 
a good environment on the basis of current human rights theory. The challenge lies 
in explaining how a good environment is essential to human dignity, autonomy or 
well-being without describing our relationship to the environment by reference to 
existing rights.  
Our dependence on the environment as a source of sustenance and natural 
resources, and its fundamental role in securing our livelihoods and health, and 
facilitating our social and cultural lives, is undeniable. These aspects of our 
relationship to the environment, however, are already protected by the rights such 
as the rights to health, to food and water, to an adequate standard of living and to 
self-determination, the environmental dimensions of which are increasingly 
recognised in international law and in human rights jurisprudence. This does not 
mean that new rights will never be justifiable, but the case study of the right to a 
good environment demonstrates the difficulty of establishing that a new right is 
compatible with the underlying theories of human rights.  
(c) New Rights Must be Capable of Sufficiently Precise Definition 
For a number of reasons, any new right which is recognised within international 
human rights law must be capable of definition precise enough to enable it to be 
attainable and capable of enforcement. In his proposal for quality control in the 
development of human rights law, Alston argued that new rights must be 
sufficiently precise as to give rise to identifiable rights and obligations.76 Mutua 
has reiterated the need for precision, saying that ‘[v]acuous, rhetorical and vague 
standards accomplish little ... To be effective, standards must have a clear path for 
their implementation and enforcement’.77 Without normative precision, specific 
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human rights may offer little practical benefit and may ultimately be little more 
than symbolic statements of aspiration. 
At the same time, however, a particular right may imply different obligations or 
require special implementation methods in different contexts.78  
It may not be possible or even helpful to try to articulate all these variables in 
exact detail. Alston, while advocating normative precision, also points out that in 
most cases a new right will start off in a rather generalised form and then 
‘gradually, through a variety of means, greater specificity will emerge.’79 He 
concludes that while some precision is necessary to give the right meaning, to 
create identifiable rights and obligations,80 and to make the right susceptible to 
effective implementation,81 the exact requirements of the right will vary according 
to the context, and, although a more specified formulation typically emerges, 
‘recognition of the right usually occurs at a much earlier stage on the basis of a 
much less sophisticated and far more imprecise formulation.’82 This has been the 
case for many rights within international human rights law, where treaties express 
rights in general terms and specific obligations are progressively articulated 
through the processes of jurisprudence and expert interpretation. As such, it is 
possible for a new right to be recognised before its full scope and content is 
precisely identified.  
However, Alston stresses the negative consequences of trying to proclaim a new 
right without sufficient precision. He says that ‘time and energy which should be 
spent focusing on specific proposals is wasted on ‘shadow-boxing’ or ‘phantom-
chasing’’ in the form of addressing or refuting interpretations of the new right 
which reflect the worst fears of its opponents rather than the aspirations of the 
majority of its proponents.83 Also, allowing States too much flexibility in 
determining their obligations creates significant difficulties for ensuring 
compliance, and may undermine the objective of the right in the first place. On the 
other hand, too much specificity in terms of States’ obligations may create 
difficulties in obtaining majority support of States, as will be discussed below. 
What is required is sufficient precision to enable the scope and content of the right 
to be understood and for obligations to be identifiable, even if the precise actions 
required must be determined on a case-by-case basis.84  
As well as being defined clearly, a new right must also be capable of 
implementation. In order to achieve this, the right must first be something which is 
attainable. A right to something which is unrealistic or impracticable will not be 
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capable of implementation, even though it might be clearly defined with precise 
obligations and standards.85 The right should also be supported by implementation 
procedures and structures.86  
These factors allow for the right to be constructed in a way which best 
facilitates its enforcement.87 Mutua has argued that enforceability of obligations is 
an essential requirement to ensure that States do not simply ratify new human rights 
without any intention of implementing them.88 He says that many States have a 
‘trigger-happy’ approach to ratification of human rights without any intent of 
implementing those rights because they regard the enforcement mechanisms as 
impotent.89 
However, it is not essential that the right be defined so precisely that it is 
justiciable in a court or tribunal. Alston has argued that, under long-standing 
systems of international human rights law, the practice of supervisions of States’ 
compliance with their human rights obligations has been considered sufficient to 
satisfy the requirement of enforcement.90 He addresses the strong links between 
implementation, enforcement and normative precision, arguing that many existing 
rights lack precision, and the level of specificity which would enable full 
justiciability is not a necessary requirement for new rights.91 
While there is debate about whether justiciability is an essential element of 
human rights, it is clear that for human rights to be practically meaningful they 
must be defined with sufficient precision to render them capable of implementation 
and enforcement in some form. Failing this, while they will remain relevant as a 
dimension of human dignity, these rights will be of little practical use to those who 
possess them.  
The requirement for some degree of specificity in the definition of new rights 
can be applied to the right to a good environment. Speaking with respect to the 
right in 1991, Alston suggested that considerable work needed to be done in 
defining the component parts and implications of the right.92 It is suggested that a 
number of key issues need to be addressed if the right to a good environment is to 
be defined with sufficient precision. The questions which must be addressed 
include:  
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 What standard of environmental health or well-being is meant by a 
‘good environment’ and how is it to be measured? 
 Are States required to take positive action to repair and restore 
environmental damage or are they obliged to prevent future damage? 
 Are States obliged to prevent third parties or non-State actors from 
damaging the environment or does the right only relate to the State’s 
own direct conduct? 
 To whom would States owe obligations? Is the right to be enjoyed by 
individuals or groups or both? 
 Does the right only relate to an individual’s/group’s immediate 
environment or are they entitled to a good environment more broadly? 
 How is the right to be balanced against other potentially conflicting 
human rights, for example the right to an adequate standard of living 
and other economic, social and cultural rights? 
It is clear from the literature is that many of these questions remain largely 
unsettled. For instance, the issue of whether the right to a good environment should 
be an individual or collective right remains the subject of debate.93 The nature and 
extent of States’ obligations is something which also requires much more 
consideration. There is debate within human rights discourse as to the geographic 
and temporal scope of States’ human rights obligations and the extent to which a 
State would owe obligations to persons outside their territory or control, or to the 
members of future generations.  
There is also much diversity in the literature with respect to the content of the 
obligations a right to a good environment would entail, with a number of scholars 
noting the intrinsic ambiguity of the concept of a ‘good environment.’94 It is 
argued that in order for the right to offer something meaningful, it must be defined 
in such a way that its ultimate goal is something which States can achieve, at least 
progressively. Further, in order to be capable of implementation, the right to a good 
environment must be defined in a way which allows it to be balanced against other 
rights. An absolute standard of environmental well-being would ignore the realities 
of governments’ other obligations, and would therefore be incapable of 
implementation and unsuitable for inclusions as a recognised human right under 
international law. 
The right should also be defined in a way which allows it to be enforced. In 
many cases damage to the environment can occur relatively quickly and easily, but 
cannot as quickly be restored, if at all. A right to a good environment is of little 
value if States do not implement it in good faith, as once a State violates the right 
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there may be little which can be done to repair the breach. It is therefore essential 
that the right be capable of enforcement.  
Existing human rights implementation and enforcement mechanisms could be 
of use in relation to an environmental right. These include periodic reporting by 
States to a supervisory body or the establishment of a dedicated committee to hear 
petitions from individuals or groups who allege that their rights have been violated. 
A process by which an individual or group could bring a complaint to an 
international human rights tribunal in order to halt an act of environmental 
destruction would be a useful tool in protecting the right to a good environment 
(and the environment itself), and would arguably be more effective than 
supervisory or reporting mechanisms, provided such a mechanism could be 
activated in a suitably timely fashion. 
Ultimately, questions of enforcement and justiciability of a right to a good 
environment are dependent on how that right is defined, the obligations which it 
imposes and the standards which apply in discharging those obligations. While it is 
not essential that every obligation, standard and implementation measure be 
specifically spelled out, it is argued that at least some consensus is required in 
relation to the scope and content of a right and the minimum standards attaching to 
its corresponding duties. If these issues cannot be settled upon then the 
effectiveness and enforceability of the right are undermined. The extent of debate 
surrounding the right to a good environment indicates that much remains to be done 
to clarify the right’s scope and content before it would satisfy this requirement. 
(d) New Rights Must Have Identifiable Rights-holders and Duty-
bearers 
A key feature of a legal right is that it is accompanied by corresponding duties, 
which are borne by a particular entity against whom the right can be claimed.95 
Under international human rights law, rights usually entail corresponding 
obligations on States, although there are also obligations resting with individuals 
and groups not to exercise their rights in a manner which interferes with the rights 
of others.96 Right-holders under international law are in most cases individuals, 
although some rights are considered to be possessed by groups collectively.97 
As discussed in the previous section, in order to ensure that a right is 
meaningful and enforceable it is necessary to define with some degree of precision 
the obligations which it entails. It is equally important to identify who the bearers 
of those obligations will be, so that it is clear who may be called upon to ensure that 
the rights are respected, protected and fulfilled. 
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Equally important (but perhaps more problematic, as the example of the right to 
a good environment will demonstrate) is the task of identifying clearly who the 
right belongs to. That is, who will be entitled to make a claim against the duty-
bearers based on the right in any given situation? To whom do the duty-bearers owe 
their obligations? Under international human rights law, States typically owe duties 
to their own citizens or to persons under their jurisdiction or control. While this has 
traditionally imposed territorial restrictions on the extent of States’ human rights 
obligations, the concept of jurisdiction has been interpreted to mean that States 
have human rights obligations with respect to any act undertaken pursuant to their 
authority, including where that act produces effects outside its territory.98 It has 
also been argued that States owe duties towards future generations to respect and 
protect their rights, although the operationalisation of these duties presents a 
number of difficulties.99 
Defining the class of persons to whom a State owes an obligation can be more 
difficult with some rights than others. While it is necessary to be able to ascribe 
responsibility for each right to an appropriate duty-bearer, it can be problematic if 
the right is defined in a way that casts either the class of right-holders or the 
corresponding duty-bearers too broadly, as this may make enforceability of the 
right difficult.  
The examination of theoretical compatibility above revealed some of the 
difficulties associated with identifying rights-holders and duty-bearers with respect 
to the right to a good environment. It was argued that it is not feasible to define the 
right in a way which links it adequately to human dignity, interests or liberty 
without relying on aspects of our relationship with the environment which are 
already protected through other human rights. This problem also applies to 
identifying rights-holders and duty-bearers.  
If the right to a good environment is defined independently of other existing 
rights then the class of potential claimants is very broad, as possession of the right 
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is not limited only to those persons who have suffered some direct impact. Where 
environmental harm occurs it would be difficult to identify a person or group with a 
sufficient interest in the environmental harm to bring a claim, without relying on 
some other interest or need which is served by the environment. Further, the 
cumulative nature of environmental harms such as pollution and climate change 
can make it difficult to identify the appropriate duty-bearer and to describe the 
geographic and temporal scope of their obligations.  
The nature of environmental harm or degradation also necessitates some 
consideration of the rights of future generations. Hiskes has argued that in order to 
achieve intergenerational justice we must recognise the rights of future generations 
to clean air, water and soil, but acknowledges the difficulty in accommodating 
these rights within existing human rights theory.100 The interests of future 
generations provide a compelling argument for greater action to protect the 
environment, and arguably a right to a good environment which does not 
accommodate the interests of future generations would be extremely limited. 
However, the interests of future generations do not necessitate the recognition of an 
independent right to a good environment, given that existing rights are capable of 
being applied to environmental degradation. Furthermore, including future 
generations in the class of potential right-holders for a right to a good environment 
would further exacerbate the difficulties in identifying claimants and duty-bearers 
outlined above.  
(e) New Rights Must be Capable of Attracting Sufficient Political 
Support 
The requirements for admitting new rights to international human rights law 
cannot be considered in isolation from the political context in which those laws are 
created. Alston and Marks have both suggested that a requirement of new rights 
should be that they have a likelihood of receiving broad support from States.101 
Without strong support from States, new rights will not progress far in international 
law, and in a practical sense there may be little point in pursuing new rights which 
have only a minimal chance of attaining an adequate level of support.  
This is not to say that there is no benefit to be gained from advocating for rights 
where States appear disinclined to support their legal recognition. Positive 
outcomes may flow from raising awareness and mobilising public support for 
greater action, even where the particular right is not recognised or complied with by 
States. Further, a lack of political support is by no means fatal to a proposal to 
recognise a new right, and where there is potential for States’ attitudes to shift over 
time then advocates for new rights ought not to be discouraged. However, in a 
context where there are many demands on States to undertake new obligations, it is 
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argued that proposals for new rights should be capable of attracting at least a 
minimum degree of political support. 
Treaty-making is arguably the best tool for creating binding human rights 
norms, but it can be a slow and difficult process. Mutua has considered the role of 
various processes and agents in the development of new human rights standards 
and concluded that many complex factors influence the process of negotiation and 
consensus building which is antecedent to the recognition of any new human 
right.102 He has pointed out that that since the end of the Cold War more States 
have been free to articulate their own positions on a number of international issues. 
He argues that we are now able to give ‘the religious, cultural, or political 
considerations relevant to a particular State more weight than [was] previously 
possible.’103 While this inevitably slows the process of treaty negotiation, it has 
allowed for a greater diversity of ideas and a better consideration of previously 
marginalised voices. 
The centrality of consensus-building in the treaty-making has a significant 
influence on the content and structure of norms which are proclaimed. Mutua 
explains that States can adopt a number of practices in order to frustrate the 
development of a new treaty, including procrastination and procedural delays, 
artificially prolonging negotiation and drafting processes, entering reservations or 
denying ratification.104 Bilder has argued that ‘the provisions of such conventions 
often reflect agreement only at the lowest common level. Even at this level, a basic 
lack of agreement or willingness to be committed may be reflected in deliberately 
vague standards, crippling exceptions, and numerous escape hatches.’105 So, while 
a broadening of participation encourages a diversity of voices, it may also force us 
to settle for standards which are less than ideally effective.  
Further, history has shown that States are typically reluctant to sign on for more 
obligations.106 This can be seen in the kinds of implementation and enforcement 
measures which are put in place. As Bilder has argued:  
Strong implementation procedures necessarily have the effect of reducing the 
parties’ flexibility and increasing their risks in case of noncompliance; and it is not 
surprising that foreign office officials, aware of future uncertainties and wishing to 
retain as much flexibility as possible, are reluctant to become committed to 
them.107  
As Bilder says, ‘the price for strong procedures in conventions may be 
nonparticipation by many governments.’108  
This attitude on the part of States has the effect of complicating and 
constraining the human rights development process. While States are cautious 
about committing themselves to further human rights obligations, they 
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simultaneously wish to appear supportive of human rights in general. States will 
therefore usually couch their opposition in terms of legitimate State interests, such 
as sovereignty, self-defence or anti-imperialism. As Mutua explains: 
Human rights are a noble ideal, and the only way to credibly confront it – 
without appearing negative – is by putting it up against another equally noble ideal. 
It is this public relations game that has turned the human rights crusade into a sport 
of organized politics within the corridors of the United Nations.109 
Any proposed new right will be destined to fail if it cannot attract at least a 
basic level of State support. In turn, the reality of States’ attitudes has a direct effect 
on the way that new rights will ultimately be defined and structured. With respect 
to the right to a good environment, the primary concern for States is likely to be the 
extent to which the right imposes positive obligations on them or restricts potential 
development activities or economic growth.  
Many national constitutions include reference to environmental rights and 
duties, suggesting that there is some level of State support for the concept of a right 
to a good environment.110 However, an examination of the content, structure and 
context of the various constitutional provisions which purport to guarantee a right 
to an environment reveals that most provisions link environmental well-being to 
human interests in some way, rather than creating a truly independent right. Many 
of the provisions are not justiciable or otherwise enforceable, suggesting that, while 
States are content to recognise the importance of the environment in a 
constitutional provision, they are reluctant to create binding legal obligations. 
Further, the wide variety of language employed suggests that States are motivated 
by a range of different factors and that, even amongst those States which do purport 
to include an environmental right, it is not possible to discern a consistent 
approach.  
While States have in the past been willing to acknowledge the environmental 
aspects of existing human rights, because doing so has little real effect beyond their 
existing obligations, they are unlikely to agree to the creation of new rights where 
such rights are accompanied by strong implementation or enforcement 
mechanisms. Weston and Bollier have identified that States’ attitudes towards the 
right to environment, and towards the environment generally, represent the 
principal barrier to the recognition of the right. They have concluded that ‘as long 
as ecological governance remains in the grip of essentially unregulated (liberal or 
neoliberal) capitalism – responsible for most of the plunder and theft of our 
ecological wealth over the last century and a half – there never will be a human 
right to environment widely honoured across the globe in any official sense’.111 
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While low levels of political support should not on their own be a reason to 
abandon proposals to recognise a new human right, in the case of the right to a 
good environment the lack of political will serves to compound the other defects 
outlined above. Given that much can be done to pursue environmental protection 
through rights which are already recognised by States, the lack of political 
feasibility for a new right leads to a conclusion that our efforts should instead focus 
on better implementation of existing law. 
IV. Conclusion 
The discussion above has outlined a number of criteria and argued that these 
should be applied in determining whether to recognise a new right within 
international human rights law. While the suggested criteria are not (and arguably 
should not be) mandatory, it is argued that a new right which failed to satisfy any of 
the requirements ought to be rejected, unless a profound reason could be asserted to 
justify its inclusion in international human rights law. The proposed criteria draw 
on the theoretical foundations of human rights, in order to ensure that new rights 
can be shown to have some connection to the sorts of interests and entitlements that 
have traditionally been considered worthy of being described as ‘rights’. This helps 
to ensure that the moral and normative weight of human rights generally is 
maintained. 
The criteria also incorporate a number of legal and pragmatic considerations, in 
recognition of the fact that in adding a new right to international human rights law 
it will acquire legal status and therefore needs to be capable of enforcement. New 
rights need to be defined in a way which provides clarity as to who the right-
holders and duty-bearers will be, and what the right guarantees and requires.  
The proposed criteria also have regard to the political realities of the way in 
which international human rights law is made. It has been argued that if a concept 
for a new right is unlikely to attract State support then there may be little point in 
scholars, NGOS or international organisations continuing to pursue its recognition. 
States of course remain free to declare any right which they agree to recognise. 
However, given the risk that uncritical expansion of human rights law could 
damage the integrity of the system as a whole, it is argued that the other criteria 
should be used to guide States as to the sorts of things which are appropriate for 
recognition as new human rights.   
The case study of the right to a good environment demonstrates the difficulties 
which can be present in seeking to have new rights declared. It is concluded that the 
right to a good environment cannot be defined in a way which satisfies all the 
proposed criteria. In particular it cannot be defined in a way which would make it 
independently justifiable on the grounds of human dignity, liberty or well-being 
which would still be attainable and politically feasible. It is concluded therefore 
that attempts to recognise a right to a good environment within international human 
rights law have little prospect of success. Ongoing proposals that the right be 
adopted only serve to divert attention away from important work that could be done 
on strengthening and clarifying the relationship between human rights and the 
environment. Rather than pursue the right to a good environment further, it is 
recommended that human rights-based approaches to environmental protection 
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focus on how existing human rights and environmental laws can be better 
implemented and enforced. 
 
